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Tails 7.14 – The Amnesic OS That Routes Everything Through Tor

By admin 13 min read
On this page
  1. What “amnesic” really means
  2. What’s in Tails 7.14
    1. The year that led here
  3. What Tails forgets
  4. What Tails remembers, on purpose
  5. Routing everything through Tor
    1. Logging in to public Wi-Fi
    2. Censored networks
    3. Things that won’t work, by design
    4. Onion sites work everywhere
  6. What Tails can’t make the world forget
    1. Habits that make the amnesia count
  7. Getting and upgrading Tails 7.14
    1. If you already use Tails
    2. If you’re new to Tails
    3. Tails or Tor Browser?
    4. What’s next
  8. Where to go next
  9. Sources

What “amnesic” really means#

Tails calls itself an amnesic operating system. You start it from a USB stick, use it, switch it off, and it forgets everything it has done. The next time you start it, it’s as though you’d never used it before. That’s how most people understand Tails, and it’s right as far as it goes.

But “forgets everything” hides a great deal of detail, and that detail is exactly where people run into problems. Tails forgets some things completely. It remembers other things on purpose, because you asked it to. And some things it can’t make anyone else forget, however carefully it’s built, because they were never on the USB stick in the first place.

Tails 7.14, released on September 30, 2026, is a good moment to look at this. It’s a minor maintenance release. It brings Tor Browser up to 15.0.24, the Tor software up to 0.4.9.13 with September’s security fixes, and the Linux kernel to a newer version. Nothing about how Tails works has changed. But because it’s the version people will download over the next couple of weeks, it’s the version they’ll be trusting, so it’s worth being clear about what that trust covers.

This post starts with what’s actually in 7.14 and the busy year that led to it. Then it goes through Tails by what it remembers and what it doesn’t. What it forgets, what it deliberately keeps, how it sends everything through Tor and what that blocks, and finally what no operating system can make the world forget. It ends with how to get or upgrade to 7.14 safely.

What’s in Tails 7.14#

The release announcement is short, which is typical of a maintenance release.

Component Tails 7.14 Why it matters
Tor Browser 15.0.24 Firefox ESR 140.17 security fixes, backports from Firefox 157, and the newer Tor
Tor client 0.4.9.13 The second round of September’s emergency Tor fixes
Linux kernel 6.12.111 A newer kernel with the latest upstream fixes
Fixed problem Korean keyboard input The default input method now works when you start a session in Korean

If you want the detail on the first two rows, our Tor Browser 15.0.24 release notes go through the browser line by line, and Tor’s September 2026 Security Fixes explains what 0.4.9.13 fixed and how it reached Tails a day after Tor Browser.

The year that led here#

A quiet release makes more sense against the background of a very busy year. Tails 7 has been updated unusually often in 2026, and several of those updates were emergencies.

  • June 4, Tails 7.8.1. An emergency release fixing a flaw in the Linux kernel that could let an application inside Tails gain administrator rights.
  • July 1, Tails 7.9.1. Another emergency release, with further kernel fixes and an update to Tor.
  • July 23, Tails 7.10. A safer shutdown procedure, a new video player that can’t reach the network, and Thunderbird moved out of the base system into optional software.
  • August 5, Tails 7.10.1. An emergency kernel fix for a flaw that, according to the release notes, a malicious website might use to take full control of Tails and deanonymise you. The Tails team said such an attack was very unlikely, but fixed it straight away.
  • September 3, Tails 7.12. The first release on a new two-week schedule. As the 7.12 announcement explained, Firefox was moving to a two-week cadence, so Tor Browser and Tails were doing the same.
  • September 2026, Tails 7.13. Tor Browser 15.0.23 and the first round of September’s Tor fixes.
  • September 30, Tails 7.14. The second round.

The pattern in those emergency releases is worth noticing. The most serious problems weren’t in Tor. They were in the Linux kernel, the core of the operating system, and the danger was that something running inside Tails, such as the browser, could break out and take control. That’s exactly the kind of attack an amnesic system is designed to limit, as the next section explains. But it only helps if you’re running the fixed version.

One more thing on timing. Tor Browser 15.0.25 came out on October 12, so a Tails release that includes it is likely soon. Tails releases are announced on the Tails news page and the Tor Project blog.

What Tails forgets#

Tails starts from a USB stick, and while it’s running, it works in the computer’s memory rather than on any hard drive. Unless you tell it otherwise, nothing you do is stored anywhere permanent, and when you shut down, that memory is cleared.

In practice, a normal Tails session forgets all of this.

  • What you browsed. History, cookies, cache, logins and open tabs are gone.
  • What you downloaded or created. Files saved anywhere other than Persistent Storage disappear.
  • What you copied. The clipboard is cleared with everything else.
  • The computer’s own drive. Tails doesn’t use the computer’s internal hard drive unless you deliberately open it, so nothing is left there.
  • Any malware that got in. If something malicious did manage to run during a session, it doesn’t survive a restart from a clean USB stick the way it would on a normal computer.

That last point is the quiet strength of the design, and it ties back to the emergency releases above. On an ordinary computer, an attacker who gets in once can often stay in. On Tails, a fresh start from the USB stick is usually a fresh start for them too. That’s not a reason to delay updates, because a working attack can still do damage during the session it runs in. But it limits how long any one mistake can last.

Tails also makes your computer less recognisable on the network. By default, it changes the hardware network address of your Wi-Fi and Ethernet cards, which networks often log. The Tails documentation explains the details and the rare cases where that causes problems.

What Tails remembers, on purpose#

Amnesia is the default, but it isn’t always convenient. Typing in a Wi-Fi password or setting up bridges every single time gets tedious fast. So Tails offers Persistent Storage, an encrypted area on the same USB stick that you can choose to create and unlock with a passphrase when you start Tails.

Persistent Storage is opt-in, one feature at a time. You choose what goes in it, and anything you don’t turn on stays amnesic.

Thing Forgotten at shutdown by default? Can you keep it in Persistent Storage?
Browsing history and cookies Yes No, Tor Browser stays amnesic
Bookmarks Yes Yes
Personal files Yes Yes, in the Persistent folder
Wi-Fi networks and passwords Yes Yes
Tor bridges Yes Yes
Encryption keys and some app data Yes Yes, for supported apps
Extra software you install Yes Yes, it can be reinstalled automatically

The table shows the trade-off. Everything in the right-hand column is something you’ve chosen to carry around on the stick. It’s encrypted, but anyone who gets the stick and your passphrase gets it too. So the advice from the Tails team is simple. Keep only what you need, use a long passphrase you don’t use anywhere else, and remember that the more you keep, the less amnesic your Tails really is.

If you keep cryptocurrency, Tails includes the Electrum wallet, updated in Tails 7.12, and its wallet files can live in Persistent Storage. That’s convenient, but it makes the stick worth stealing. Treat it accordingly, and never copy wallet addresses from sources you can’t verify, for reasons we explain in Onion Phishing: How Fake Mirrors Clone Real Addresses.

Routing everything through Tor#

The second half of the Tails promise is in its title. Everything goes through Tor. Not just the browser, but every program that tries to reach the internet.

This is the main difference between Tails and simply running Tor Browser on your normal computer. Tor Browser protects what happens inside Tor Browser. Everything else on your computer, from system updates to other apps to the occasional program that phones home, uses your ordinary connection. Tails is built so that connections which don’t go through Tor are blocked. A program that tries to get around Tor doesn’t get a slower connection. It gets none.

That has some practical consequences worth knowing before you rely on it.

Logging in to public Wi-Fi#

Hotel, café and airport Wi-Fi often makes you log in through a web page before you can use the internet, a so-called captive portal. Tor can’t connect until you’ve done that, but logging in needs a browser that isn’t using Tor. Tails solves this with the Unsafe Browser, which is switched off by default and has to be turned on from the Welcome Screen when you start Tails. It doesn’t use Tor, so use it only to get past the login page, never for anything else.

Censored networks#

If your network blocks Tor, Tails can connect through bridges, the same unlisted entry points Tor Browser uses. You can set them up when Tails first connects, and keep them in Persistent Storage so you don’t have to enter them every time. For which kind of bridge to use, including WebTunnel and Snowflake, see Bridges, Snowflake and WebTunnel.

One thing to keep in mind. Tails can hide what you do from your network, but by default it doesn’t hide that you’re using Tor. If simply being seen to use Tor is a risk where you are, bridges help with that too. It’s also worth reading Is Tor Legal? Using Onion Services Responsibly before you start.

Things that won’t work, by design#

Routing everything through Tor rules some things out.

  • Video and voice calls usually need a kind of connection, UDP, that Tor doesn’t carry, so most won’t work.
  • Programs that insist on a direct connection simply fail, because the system won’t let them bypass Tor.
  • Some apps are kept off the network entirely. Since Tails 7.10, the default video player can’t reach the network at all, which closes off one more way a file could make your computer connect somewhere without your knowledge.
  • Large downloads are slow, because Tor is slower than a direct connection and its relays are run by volunteers.

Onion sites work everywhere#

The flip side is that every program on Tails can reach onion services. Tor Browser is the main one, but software updates, email clients and other tools can all use onion addresses where they exist. Several open-source projects publish onion mirrors for their downloads and updates, as we list in Open-Source Projects on Onion, and our Official Onion Mirrors Directory covers the wider picture.

The most important thing to remember is that “everything through Tor” hides where your connections come from. It doesn’t stop you identifying yourself. If you log in to your usual email in Tails, that email provider knows it’s you, Tor or no Tor.

What Tails can’t make the world forget#

Tails controls the USB stick and the session running from it. It has no control over the computer underneath, the network around it, the services you use, or the people in the room. The Tails project is unusually open about this in its own warnings and limitations, and it’s worth taking seriously.

  • A compromised computer. Tails starts from your USB stick, but it still runs on someone’s hardware. If that computer’s firmware has been tampered with, or someone has fitted a hardware keylogger between the keyboard and the computer, Tails can’t detect or undo it. Use a computer you have good reason to trust.
  • Cameras and people. A camera, a person behind you, or a screen visible through a window can let someone see what you’re doing. Amnesia only applies to the computer.
  • Accounts you log in to. If you sign in to an account linked to your name, the service knows it’s you. Tails hides your location, but not your identity once you’ve told a website who you are.
  • Files that carry information about you. Documents and photos often contain hidden details, such as the author’s name, the device that made them, or where a photo was taken. Tails includes a metadata cleaning tool. Use it before sharing anything.
  • Your writing and your habits. The way you write, the times you’re online and the topics you return to can all link sessions together, however clean each session is.
  • The USB stick itself. If someone takes your stick, they know you use Tails. If you use Persistent Storage and they get your passphrase, they get what’s in it.
  • What you’ve already shared. Anything you posted, sent or uploaded lives on in someone else’s system. Shutting down Tails doesn’t recall it.

Habits that make the amnesia count#

None of that is a reason not to use Tails. It’s a reason to use it well. A few habits close most of the gaps.

  1. Keep Tails updated. The emergency releases of 2026 show why. Upgrading takes minutes, and an out-of-date Tails gives up the protection you’re relying on.
  2. Restart between identities. If you use Tails for two purposes that shouldn’t be linked, shut down and start again in between. Tor Browser’s “New identity” button helps within a session, but a full restart is cleaner.
  3. Keep Persistent Storage small. Store what you need, not what’s convenient.
  4. Don’t mix your real accounts into anonymous sessions. Checking your personal email “just quickly” in a session you meant to keep anonymous links the two.
  5. Clean files before sharing them. Use the metadata cleaner every time, not just when you remember.
  6. Use the security level that fits the job. Tor Browser in Tails has the same security levels as anywhere else. For sensitive work, raise it, as explained in Tor Browser Security Levels.
  7. Get addresses from their real sources. Tails can’t protect you from a phishing site you choose to visit. Check onion addresses as described in How to Verify an Onion Address Is Official, and steer clear of the link lists described in Why Most ‘Hidden Wiki’ Lists Are Full of Scams.

Getting and upgrading Tails 7.14#

If you already use Tails#

If you’re on Tails 7.0 or later, Tails will offer an automatic upgrade to 7.14 when you connect to Tor, and your Persistent Storage stays as it is. Let it run, then restart. If the automatic upgrade isn’t offered, fails partway through, or Tails won’t start afterwards, follow the Tails team’s manual upgrade instructions.

To check which version you’re running, open the About Tails window from the Tails menu. You want 7.14 or later. If you’re on an older major version, start with the manual upgrade instructions rather than waiting for an automatic one.

If you’re new to Tails#

You’ll need a USB stick and a computer you can start from it. The Tails website lists the current requirements, and it’s worth checking them first, because not every computer can run Tails.

  1. Download Tails only from tails.net. The installation instructions guide you through it for Windows, macOS and Linux. There’s a USB image for USB sticks, and an ISO image for DVDs and virtual machines. The Tails website is also reachable over onion, as listed in Tor Project’s Official Onion Sites.
  2. Verify the download. The installation pages include a verification step. Don’t skip it. Fake security tools are a common trap, as we explain in Fake ‘Dark Web’ Apps in 2026, and the same principles apply to Tails as to Tor Browser. Our guide How to Download and Install Tor Browser Safely explains why verification matters.
  3. Install to a USB stick you can dedicate to Tails. Installing erases whatever is on the stick, including any existing Persistent Storage. If you’re upgrading an existing Tails stick, use the upgrade route above instead.
  4. Start the computer from the stick. How you do this depends on the computer. The Tails instructions cover the common cases.
  5. Decide about Persistent Storage later. Use Tails without it for a while first. Then add only what you find you actually need.

Tails or Tor Browser?#

They solve different problems. Tor Browser is the right choice for private browsing on your own computer or phone, every day. Tails is the right choice when you need nothing to be left on the computer afterwards, when you’re using a computer that isn’t yours, or when you need every program, not just the browser, to go through Tor. On a phone, the closest equivalent is routing your apps through Tor, which we cover in our Tor VPN beta overview.

You need Tor Browser Tails
Private browsing on your own device Yes Works, but more than you need
Nothing left on the computer afterwards No, it’s installed on the computer Yes
Every app forced through Tor No, only the browser Yes
Use on a phone Yes, on Android No
Easy everyday use Yes Takes more effort

What’s next#

Tails now follows a two-week release cycle in step with Tor Browser. With Tor Browser 15.0.25 released on October 12, the next Tails release is likely close. And when Tor Browser 16 reaches stable, Tails will follow shortly after, as we explain in Tor Browser 16 Alpha (16.0a13): What’s Coming.

Where to go next#

Sources#

1 comment

  1. Pingback: Bridges, Snowflake and WebTunnel – Using Tor Where It’s Blocked

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